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In Buckingiam v. Vincent, 48 N. Y. SuppI. 747, the defendant furnished the plaintiff's husband with men and teams for
Instructions, removing goods, and directed his men to remove
Liability,
such goods as the husband should point out.
Master
They removed a piano in. accordance with these
instructions, and against the protest of the wife, who owned
it. The court held the master liable for conversion, as the
men had not removed it for any purpose of their own, but
in accordance with his instruction to remove such goods as
the plaintiffs husband should point out.
BANKS AND BANKING.

Pepterday v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 38 Atl. (Pa.) 1030, presents an interesting question, rendered more interesting by an
able dissenting opinion of Judge Mitchell. A
Check
for Collection, bank had received from its depositor railroad
Failure
stock to be sold: it was sold by a broker and the
of Maker.
Depositor,
Liability

bank received in payment the broker's check,
which it credited to the depositor's account. The
check was sent on for collection, but payment was refused
because of the failure of the broker. Meanwhile the depositor
had checked out the amount and the question was whether
the bank could charge it back against the depositor's account.
The majority of the court thought not, basing their opinion
on the duty of the bank to receive nothing but cash in payment of the stock. Mitchell, J., dissented, holding that the
case was simply the ordinary one of a depositor's check not
being paid. It is not quite clear, though, how he gets away
from the principle and authorities cited by the majority.
CARRIERS.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, applying the rule
that it is the duty of a sleeping-car company to
use only reasonable care in guarding the property
Property
of Passengers, of passengers from thieves, has reached a concluLiability
sion in the case of Belden v. Pullman Palace-Car
Co., 43 S. W. 22, which was as follows:
Sleeping-Car
Companies,
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A, a passenger, brought an action against the company for
the value of a valise left by him when he retired, by the side
of his berth, in the aisle. The evidence showed that the car
had two servants whose duty it was to sit by turns at the end
of the aisle to wait on passengers and see that nothing was
stolen; that during the first part of the night one of these
servants kept watch, and that when he left the car to awaken
the other, the valise was in its place; that during the latter
part of the night, while the second servant was on duty several
persons came into the car; that the servant woke the passengers for Austin, at which place several got off taking their
valises with them; that the servant could not identify particular valises where there were a number of passengers each
having one; that no passengers left the car that night except
at Austin. Held, that a finding that the valise was taken at
Austin, and that its loss was not due to the negligence of the
company's servants, was sustained by the evidence.
The Supreme Court of New York, in Huber v. Nassau
StreetCar, Electric R. CO., 48 N. Y. Suppl. 38, decided that
Right of Way the car of a surface railway has no paramount
right of way at the intersection of a cross street.
A carrier is hound to accept a ticket which contains a provision that it must be signed by the person intending to use it,
though tendered by a wife whose husband signed
Tickets,
Representa- it in his own name, where it was sold to the bustions of
band for the use of the wife by an agent of the
Agent
carrier, who informed the husband that the wife's
signature was unnecessary, and that he might sign it: Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Goodman (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas),
43 S. W. 580.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Whether or not a member of Congress is privileged from
service of civil process issued out of a State court while he is
Service of in attendance at a session of Congress (said proCivii Process, cess being returnable during the session), by virtue
Privilege of of Art. I., § 6, of the Constitution of the United
Congressman States, exempting senators and representatives
from arrest, except for treason, felony and breach of the
peace, during their attendance at a session of Congress, is a
federal question; and in the absence of a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States extending the privilege
to civil suits, a motion to quash such writ thus served on a
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member of Congress will be denied: Bartlett v. Blair (New
Hampshire), 38 Atl. 1004.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has declared that
a law requiring peddlers to pay specified taxes, and, in proTaxation, visos, exempting ex-Confederate and ex-Federal
Uniformity, soldiers, and certain other classes of persons from
Validity
payment of such tax for peddling is in violation
of the constitutional provision that "taxation shall be equal
and uniform:" ExparteJones,43 S. W. 513.
CONTRACTS.

An agreement supported by an executed consideration, to
give by will one's property to a certain person, is effectual so
Agreement to far as relates to the estate which he may have at
makeWill,
his death, and the execution of such agreement.
Specific
may be enforced by way of specific performance,
Performance or otherwise, if he fail to have a will to
that
effect: Johannes v. Martian (Supreme Court), 48 N. Y.
Suppl. 102.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, of New York, has
decided that where an inventor grants an exclusive license to
Assignment use the invention, the fact that it.is not patented
of Invention, does not invalidate the license on the ground of
Consideration lack of consideration, as the intent which the
invention gives him to obtain a patent is sufficient upon which
to found a consideration for a promise to pay for such exclusive use, made before the patent is issued: Bezer v. Hall
Signal Co., 48 N. Y. Suppl. 203.
. In Cunningham v. Fairchild,43 S. W. 32, the plaintiff deposited with A sums of money as margins for gambling operations on the cotton market, A being engaged in
Margins,
Gambling
soliciting business of this character. And A in
Transactions, turn deposited the money as margins with the
Advances,
defendants, cotton brokers. A having absconded
Recovery,
Quasithe defendant closed out the plaintiff's contracts for
Contract

lack of sufficient margin, without giving the de-

fendant an opportunity to advance further margins to protect
himself. The Court of Appeals of Texas held that even if A
and the defendants could be said to be partners yet there
could be no recovery, as the contract was illegal and the
money paid, and such a contract would not be enforced nor
any relief be grantedfor any' violation of the same.
Whatever criticism may be made as to the sweeping char-
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acter of the dicta the correctness of the decision is unquestioned, the parties being in pOari delicto and the defendant, if
he and A were partners, being in default under his contract
with the plaintiff
CRIMINAL LAW.

In Queen v. Jones [1898], 1 Q. B. i9, the defendant ordered a nmeal at a restaurant. He made no verbal representation at the time as to his ability to pay, nor was
False
Pretences,
Act
Amounting to

any question asked him with regard to it.

After

the meal he stated that he had (as was the fact)
only one halfpenny in his possession. The court

held this did not amount to the offense of obtaining goods by
false pretences.
A defendant in a Texas court had published an article alleging that the conductors of a certain street railway, as a
class, were of a low class and of foul character;
Libel,
Defamation of that they were descendants of Oscar Wilde, etc.
a Class
The Court of Criminal Appeals, of Texas, held
that this was not only libelous, but that it affected the reputation of every conductor on the line, although no names were
mentioned: Jones v. Statc, 43 S. W. 78.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.
In New York the modern and better rule prevails that an
action lies for the wife against the person who has alienated
her husband's affections. It was held, however,
Alienation
of Husband's in Buichanan v. Foster, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 732, that
Affections,
proof that the husband has abandoned his wife
Action,
Proof,
and maintained improper relations with defendant
Sufficiency
is not sufficient, it being necessary for the plaintiff
to go a step further and show that the defendant was the active
cause of his actions, "the pursuer and not the pursued."
A sensible rule prevails in New York with regard to alimony
pending a divorce: Plaintiff must furnish some evidence
tending to show a reasonable ground for comAlimony,
Action for, mencing the action.
Mere information and belief
Cause
without setting forth the grounds thereof will not
answer: Downing v. Downwing, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 727.
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In Ingle v. Ihngle, 38 Atl. (N. J.) 953, the complainant in a
bill to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud set forth that
Annulment complainant had, while under arrest upon the
of Marriage, charge of seduction under promise of marriage,
Cause,
married defendant, and that one of the essentials
Proof
of the crime, to wit: The promise of marriage did
It was held, however,
not exist and could not be proved.
that complainant must further show that the charge was known
by defendant to be false and made without probable cause, and
the bill was therefore dismissed.
A wife's legal residence is usually that of her husband; but
when she lives apart from him with good cause, she may,
Divorce,

Jurisdiction,
Domicile

especially for the purpose of divorce proceedings,
acquire a legal residence in another State. We
may therefore quite agree with Hall v. Hall, 43

S. W. (Ky.) 429-a case of an admitted bona fide residence,
without in any wise giving our approval to the laws of certain
Western States which seem to the unenlightened to invite nonresidents to enter the divorce courts.
Caln v. Cain, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 173, is an interesting case.
Prior to a recent statute the New York courts had uniformly
refused to allow examination of the plaintiff's perMarriage,
Annulment, SOnl by defendant's surgeon in an action for personal injuries. In this case, however, which was
Physical
Incapacity a proceeding for annulment of the marriage
by
the wife on the ground of the impotency of the husband, it
was held that the husband must submit to an examination,
the court resting its order upon the necessity of the case, as
the plaintiff would otherwise be utterly unable to prove her
case where, as here, the defendant refused to appear.
Stil's Estate, 39 Atl. (Pa.) i6, raises the old question
whether a State will recognize the validity of a marriage
between its own citizens who had gone to another
Mlarriage,
Conflict of jurisdiction in order to escape the operation of its
Laws
laws. The Pennsylvania Statute forbids the mirriage of a divorced person with her paramour during the life
of the injured husband. The Supreme Court by a vote of
4 to 3 only decided that they could not recognize the legality
of a marriage performed in Maryland where no such law
exists. The opinion of Green, J., contains a full titation of
authorities but one regrets that the opposing view is not
represented by a dissenting opinion.
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If a husband can waive his ordinary legal interest in his
prospective wife's estate by means of an anti-nuptial agreePost-Nuptial
Agreements

ment, it is quite obvious that he can do the same
thing by a post-nuptial agreement, at least in those

States where a wife is now allowed to make contracts with her
husband, and to convey her property: Leac/ v. Rains, 48 N,
E. (Ind.) 858.
Gloster v. Glostcr, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 16o, is the most recent
illustratioh of the effort of an abused wife to obtain redress.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of 3 to 2, held that
Separate
maintenance both
Maintenance, plaintiff was entitled to separate
on the ground of cruelty (the facts are too numer' Cruelty,
Abandonment ous to recite) and on the ground of abandonment,

the proof of which was that the husband had turned her out
of doors upon her refusing to promise not to go near her
parents.

Grey,V. C., took a sensible view of the duty of a husband to
support his wife in the recent case of Furth v. Furth, 39 Atl.
As he puts it: "The mere fact that
Support, (N. J,) 128.
Duty of

Husband

the husband presently has no money, does not discharge him of the duty to support his wife, though

it may be some excuse for a present failure." The defendant
being an able-bodied man was, therefore, ordered to pay his
wife two dollars a week, the court reserving to itself the right
to either increase the amount or to refuse the usual remedy for
non-compliance, as circumstances might require.

INFANCY.

The strong tendency of the decisions is in favor of making
the infant responsible for fraudulent misrepresentations as to
Fraud,
Responsibility,
Rescission of
Contract

his age, by which he induces a third party to
contract with him: but his liability must be
enforced by an action of deceit, and the contract
thus induced is not rendered any more enforce-

able by reason of the fraud. So decided in N. Y Building
Loan & Banking Co. v. Fisher,48 N. Y. Suppl. 152, where it
was also held that the defendant infant could not be compelled
to return the money secured by plaintiff's mortgage, even
though it had been spent in buildings on the mortgaged property.
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INSOLVENCY.

It is hardly worth while to cite authorities at the present
day for the proposition that in Pennsylvania a debtor may
lawfully prefer his creditor by confessing a judgPreference,
Validity
ment. It is worth noting, though, that in Braden
v. First National Bank of Clarion, 38 Atl. (Pa.) 1023, such a
judgment was held valid, though it covered the debtor's contingent liability as endorser, as well as his direct and existing
indebtedness.
INSURANCE.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
shown in a well-reasoned opinion that a supposed agreement
to permit other insurance, and a fortiori mere
Insured's
Intention to knowledge on the part of the company's agent of
Place Other the insured's intention to effect additional insur-.
Insurance ance, cannot in an action at law avail to defeat
the
express stipulations of the written instrument subsequently
delivered. The antecedent agreement is merged in the written contract, and there is no waiver of any right by the company to be implied from the mere fact of knowledge of the
insured's intention. But in a proper case a contract may, of
course, be reformed in equity: United Fireman'sInsurance Co.
v. Thomas, 82 Fed. 406.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

The old common law rule that an employment of a servant
in the absence of any agreement to the contrary is in law an
Discharge, employment for one year, has been much restricted,
Customs
and in England (and generally) in the case of
household servants at least, such a contract is in law from
month to month only. In Aloult v. Holliday [1898], I Q. B.
125, the plaintiff tried to go a step further and prove a custom
that either master or servant might determine the service at
the end of the first calendar month by notice given at or before the expiration of the first fortnight. While the custom
was not proved, the Court on Appeal stated plainly that such
custom, if proved, was reasonable, and would be respected.
C/'icago & A. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 48 N. E. (Ill.) 826, is a
recent exposition of familiar law. The company was held
liable to a mason who fell from a defective scaffold
Fellow
Servant because its foreman in charge of the construction
of the scaffolding " knew, or was bound to know, its defects
and imperfect construction."
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Hida v. American Glucose Co., 48 N. E. (N. Y.) 897, is an
illustration of how the Legislature may enlarge the duty of a
Liability of master to his servant, the New York statute cornMaster for
Negligence

pelling the owners of factories to erect certain fire
escapes for the benefit of their employes. The

administratrix of the decedent (who was burned to death)
failed to recover, however, both because the fire escapes provided were held to be a sufficient compliance with the statute,
and becapse decedent was quite aware of the danger of the
situation.
The question whether the person whose negligence caused
the injury is a fellow-servant or not is a question
Fellow

Servant,
Question

for Jury

for the jury, if there is evidence that his principal,
though not his sole duty, was that of superintend-

ence: Gardner v. New England Telegraph &

Telephone Co., 48 N. E. (Mass.) 937.

NEGLIGENCE.
In Downey v. Law, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 207, the plaintiff had
fallen down an open coal chute in a sidewalk in front of premOwner of
Premises,

Independent
contractor

ises owned and occupied by defendant.

chute

The

had been left open by the senants of

an independent contractor, who was removing
ashes, and this fact was relied on to excuse the

defendant; but the court said: " In general, where the owner
of property has an agreement with an independent contractor
for the performance of work, the owner of the property is not
liable for the independent contractor's negligence; but, if the
work itself creates the danger, the proprietor is liable to persons injured by a failure to properly guard or protect the
work." The present case was held to be within the latter
class.
It is familiar law that one who claims the benefit of a statute must show that he belongs to the class of persons intended
to be benefited by the statute. In East St. Louis
Statute,
Benefit,
Connecting Ry. Co. v. Egginan, 48 N. E. (Ill.) 98 1,
City
it was strongly urged that an employe of a railOrdinance
road did not come within the protection of a city
ordinance forbidding trains to be run through the city streets
without ringing a bell or faster than six miles an hour. The
court, however, took the opposite and more sensible view.
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

In Davis v. Reilly [1898], 1 Q. B. I, the Queen's Bench Division have held in accord with the current of authority that,
if the buyer of goods accept a bill of exchange,
Promissory in which the seller is the drawer, for the price
Note,
thereof, an action will not lie for that price, upon
Time of
the dishonor of the bill, if at the time of suit the
Action
bill is outstanding in a third party, and the plaintiff will be in no better position by obtaining possession of the
bill prior to the day of trial.
If the plaintiff were permitted to recover while the bill is
outstanding in the hands of a third party, the defendant might
be called upon to pay again in an action by the holder of the
bill: Kearsiake v. i11organ, 5 Term Reports, 513 (1795);
Price v. Price, 16 i. and W. 232 (1846).
PRACTICE.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently applied
the principle of its former decisions in regard to the limitation
of the time when substantial amendments of a
Rescatn,
Adludi. statement of a plaintiff's cause of action may be
Allowance of allowed, a matter of vital practical importance, to
Amendment, the following case.
In a suit on a policy of fire
Limitation of
the plaintiffs to recover was
of
right
the
insurance,
Time
denied, because of their alleged violation of one
of the conditions of the policy by keeping prohibited articles
on the insured premises. Before trial the plaintiffs, by leave
of court, filed an amended statement. At the trial the plaintiffs elected to proceed on this amended statement.
The
amendment was objected to because it introduced a new cause
of action, by alleging a promise by defendant to pay, notwithstanding the violation of the conditions, and because the
amendment was not made until the limitation fixed by the policy (twelve months after the fire) had expired, when the right of
action had closed. The court below ruled that the amendment
having been allowed was res adjudicata. The Supreme Court
decided that if the amendment were improperly allowed, it
gained no strength because of its allowance, and the question
was an open one whether there could be any recovery. The
opinion of Green, J., refers to the settled doctrine that a new
cause of action cannot be introduced or new parties brought in,
or a new subject matter presented, or a fatal or material defect
in the proceedings be corrected after the statute of limitations
has become a bar. The contention that the cause of action is
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founded in the agreement to settle, and not upon the policy, is
disposed of by showing that the policy is the foundation of
the action. Without the policy, the claim of the plaintiffs
could have no legal existence. The decisions in Pennsylvania
are reviewed on the main question. The application of this
principle as to the limitation of time is illustrated by the case
of mechanics' lien, with an inferesting xference to the opposite view in the New Jersey case of Tile Co. v. Drinkhouse, 36
Atl. 1034 (1896). The law, with the citations from various
States in support of it, is thus stated, in conclusion , If the
amendment had been applied for while the right of action was
running, it might properly have been granted, but after the
right of action had ceased under the contract, it could not be
done. Because there could be no recovery on the policy
alone, the right to recover could not be created by an amendment which was not solicited until after the right to recover
for the loss was barred by the contract of the parties. G;ier
v. Norkern Assurance Co., 39 Atl. io.
PROPERTY.

Under the Revised Statutes of Texas for 1895, Article 3318,
which give the proprietors of hotels and boarding houses a
specific lien on all property or baggage deposited
Landlord's
with them for the amount of the charges against
Lien,
Drummers' them or their owners, if guests of such hotel or
Samples
boarding house, the Court of Civil Appeals has
held that a hotelkeeper has no lien for the unpaid board bill
of a travelling salesman upon the goods and samples of such
salesman which belong to his employer, at least where the
hotel proprietor knew that the baggage contained such samples
when the salesman was received as a guest of the hotel:
Torrey v. McClellan, 43 S. W. 64.
In the case of Hetterman v. Powers, 43 S.W. i8o, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky had before it the interesting
question whether the members of a voluntary
Unions,

Trade Labels, union of cigarmakers who were not engaged in
Rights of
business on their own account, and were not

Property

owners of the product of their labor, but simply
employes for a stipulated wage, were entitled to the protection
of a court in the exclusive use of a trademark or label, setting forth that the goods so marked were the product of a
workman who was a member of such voluntary union. The
court held that the members of such association were entitled
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to such protection, although the goods sold under such labels
were not their property; and that while the label was not a
trademark in the ordinary sense of the word, it did represent
a valuable right, which might be the subject of legal protection on the same principles that the courts of equity have
based the right to protect trademarks and good-will.
This question of the right of the Cigar Makers' National
Union of America to the exclusive use and protection of such
a label has been before the courts a number of times, and the
decisions on the subject are in conflict. Thus in Weener v.
Drayton (S. C. Mass.) 25 N. E. 46 (189o) ; Union v. Carlhcirn,
40 Minn. 243 (1889); l1/cVey v. Brendell, 144 Pa. 235 (189i),
and Schneider v. Williams, 44 N. J. Eq. 391 (1888), relief was
denied on various grounds, the chief of which was that there
was no property right in the plaintiffs to be protected. The
converse, however, was held in Strasser v. Mooneis, io8 N. Y.
611 (1888), and Carson v. Ur , (C. C. E. D. Mo.), 39 Fed. 777
(1889), in the latter of which, however, the plaintiff.was a
manufacturer as well as a member of the union.

REAL PROPERTY.

Gunn v. Wynne, 43 S. W. (Tex.) 290, illustrates one of the
difficulties constantly arising in those States where by constiiomestead, tution or statute homesteads are exempt from
Residence,
execution. The defendants had left their farm,
Execution
bought a house in the city, where they had resided for eight years, and yet were allowed to testify that their
residence in town was purely temporary, for the purpose of
educating their children, and that they had always intended
to return to the country which remained their home.
The result of a divorce upon a homestead held as cominunity property was considered in Southwestern Mfg. Co. v.
Swan, 43 S. W. (Tex.) 573, where it was held
Homestead,
that admitting that the court granting the divorce
Divorce,
Effect,
might have at the same time disposed of the
menants
property,
yet as it had not done so, the legal
prpryyeas,
Common
effect was that husband and wife became tenants
-in common, and the interest of each was subject to liens of
judgment.
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The Supreme Court of Tennessee in a recent decision,
Murray v. Allard, 43 S. W. 355, after a thorough and scientific examination of the question, has held that
Mineral
Rights,
petroleum oil is a mineral, and that the right to
Reservation, enter and take the same isembraced within the
Petroleum
reservation by the grantor in a deed of mines,
minerals and metals upon the premises conveyed.
Dunham v. Short, ioi Pa. 35 (1882), is in opposition to this
position, the court holding that while petroleum is in a strict
scientific sense a mineral, the parties to the contract must be
presumed to have used the word mineral in its popular rather
than in its strictly scientific sense. The decision in Dzunham
v. Short, however, seems to be somewhat shaken by Gill v.
Watson (No.2), 11o Pa. 312 (I885).
A landlord having given the requisite notice to his tenant
to quit the premises at the end of the term and the tenant
Recovery of having refused, the landlord sued out a writ before
Premises,
a Justice of the Peace to obtain possession of the
Malicious
premises, which writ was executed by a constable
Prosecution. and the tenant dispossessed.
In an action by
tenant against landlord for malicious prosecution it was held
that proof of the fact that a Justice of the Peace had no
authority or jurisdiction to issue writs of possession for real
estate, and that the acts of the constable were illegal, was
insufficient to establish a malicious prosecution. The decision
of the court was based upon the ground that the gist of the
action for malicious prosecution is the putting of legal process
in force regularly for the mere purpose of vexation and annoyance, but that in this case the defendant having a just cause
of complaint had tried to put in force process through the
medium of a court having no jurisdiction. The position of
the defendant was, therefore, as though he had taken possession of the land and ejected the tenant without any writ at
all, for which act he would be responsible in trespass: Vinson
v. Flynn (Ark.), 43 S. W. 146.
SALES.

The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, in the case
of Gtsta/son v. Rustecncyer, 39 Atl. 104, has held that misrepMisrepresen- resentations as to the dimensions of land are
tations,
within the rule laid down in Big. Frauds, p. 627,
aDtionof
that "in actions for deceit in sales of personalty;
Measure of
Damages

or realty, the measure of damages is the diffeience between the actual value of the property at
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the time of the purchase and its value if the property had
been what it was represented to be."
SLANDER.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Lyons v. Straton, 43
Words
Actionable

Per se

S. W.

446 , have decided that where the reasonable

and well understood meaning of words spoken by

the defendant amounts to a statement that the

plaintiff, an unmarried woman, was unchaste, the words are
actionable per se, as imputing the crime of fornication.
NVILLS.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in a recent case, asserts
that the rule is clear in that state that where there is a devise
Construction, to one, but should he die without issue, then the
,Die without estate to go over to another; but should he die
leaving issue, then the estate to vest in such issue
Issue"
absolutely. The phrase " die without issue" refers to a death
in the lifetime of the testator, and, therefore, if the first beneficiary survives the testator he is entitled to a fee: Lawlor v.
Hols/an, 38 Atl. 903.
A testator bequeathed the income of all his property to M
and I for life, " and should either of them die, the survivor.
shall take what would belong to the deceased
"Survivor" during her natural life, and her children, if she
has any," and should both die without children,
then the property to go to the testator's heirs; if either or
both should have children, then "they shall inherit what I
gave to their parents."
I died leaving a husband and one child surviving, M being
still living. It was held that I's child took a fee in one-half
and was, therefore, entitled immediately to one-half of the
net income: Trust Co. v. Pecklam, 38 Atl. 1001.
A will provided, inter alia, that the executor should not be
required to give bond, and after reciting that the testator was
largely indebted to him for " means, advice and
Debts Due
Executor

other aid,"

it continued : " Therefore I declare

that whatever of my estate shall be taken or
claimed by him'as therefor due, shall be considered as due
him without further proof, and shall be conclusive to my
heirs."
It was held, on a bill for an accounting filed by the heirs
against the executor, that this gift was not void for uncertainty,
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and, so far as concerned the heirs, the testator had as much
right to leave his property to his executor, who was also his.
creditor, as he had to give it to a stranger, and that the provision including the heirs was binding: Maurar v. Bowmair
(S. C. Ill.), 48 N. E. 823.
A devise to executors "for the benefit of P and my son
J, for them and their children, should they have any," was
held to be a devise of undivided moieties to P
Vesting
and J respectively for life, with remainders in fee
to their children, which would vest upon the birth
of such children : Barclay v. Platt (S. C. Ill.), 48 N. E. 972.
E, domiciled in Missouri, owned lands there, as well as in
Illinois, Colorado and Kansas. He executed his will in MisInterpretation, souri, whereby he devised his son a life estate
in all his realty, with remainder to the heirs of
Illegitimate
Children,
Conflict of Law

his (the son's) body. E's son had legitimate
and illegitimate children, the latter of which,

however, he had recognized as his children.
Under the law of Kansas an illegitimate has the quality of
inheritance from a parent, provided he has been recognized as
his child by such parent. Under the law of Missouri an illegitimate cannot inherit from his father unless his parents subsequently marry and his father recognizes him as his child.
The Kansas courts, in interpreting the will, held that the
Missouri law should apply; that the testator must be presumed to have used the words "heirs of his body" according
to the law of his domicil; and, therefore, a son who would
have been legitimate and entitled to inherit under the Kansas
rule was excluded. In other words, the court held that the
intention of the testator must be ascertained according to the
laws of his domicil, and that a devise of real estate must be
so interpreted and upheld by the courts of another state
unless such interpretation is forbidden by some positive statutory regulation of that other state: Keith v. Eaton, 50 Pac.
271.

